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Media Analysis of Conflict in Chinese-Zambian Engagement: From
ZAFFICO to the COVID-19 Discrimination Controversy
Nicole Mazurova, Pokai Tsao, Taurence Chisholm Jr.
This paper examines the role media plays in polarising views and escalating tension. The cases studied
reflect the competing perspectives on Chinese engagement in Zambia, from the courtship of Chinese
investment to rising anti-Chinese sentiment. Based on a comparative media analysis of English and
Mandarin news articles about the ZAFFICO and COVID-19 discrimination controversies, we argue that
the multi-layered polarisation in Zambia’s media landscape amplifies existing identity-conflicts.
Framing—the tone, word choice, and selection of detail—in articles changes with the positionality of
the media outlet and shapes the discourse around the cases. Sensationalisation, misinformation, and
divergent frames contribute to conflict between different identity groups, which is capitalised on in a
divisive political environment. The media facilitates blackboxing and us vs. them thinking which often
precede conflict. The ‘other’ that appears in the Zambian media landscape includes ‘China/the Chinese’,
‘the opposition’, and ‘the ruling Patriotic Front’.

Introduction
A globalised mass media is transforming communication, as well as its most intense form,
conflict. Each conflict unfolding today has a media dimension because those directly
involved, as well as outside audiences, form perspectives based on varied information that
is more accessible and spreads quicker than ever before. New media further pluralises the
media space and provides opportunities for audience engagement. While these
developments have a democratising effect, the rise of voices competing for space has its
disadvantages. There is mounting evidence that changes to how the public consumes and
shares news intensify political attitudes and identities, which leads to more polarised
societies (Cottle, 2006, p. 17). Self-interested actors are learning how to manipulate content
and information flow which accelerates the process, and these actors include media
conglomerates themselves (Orlowski, 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa is an interesting case study
to analyse the relationship between media and conflict because of the dramatic changes to
the continent’s media landscape, as well as competition between international and local
networks for a share in the information space. We selected a topic that is much-debated in
academic and policy circles—the dilemma between the open reception of China’s presence
and vast investment, and rising anti-Chinese sentiment.
We specifically look at Zambian-Chinese engagement in the trading sector, as Zambia has a
vibrant democracy and a relatively liberal media environment (CIVICUS, 2017). Zambia is
also the main recipient of Chinese investment and home to a growing Chinese population. 1
There is a rich literature on Zambian-Chinese relations and increasing interest in how the
media shapes perceptions, tensions, and conflict in the country (Jiang, Li et al., 2016; Li and
Rønning, 2013; Li and Shi, 2019; Wasserman and Madrid-Morales, 2018). The following
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questions guided our research: How do frame dynamics compare between Zambian and
Chinese media sources? What are the consequences when frames clash? Are frame
differences a mechanism of conflict? We seek to add to the literature by conducting a frame
analysis of Zambian and Chinese media sources’ coverage of two conflicts: 1) the ZAFFICO
controversy; and 2) anti-Chinese sentiment in response to COVID-19, using media conflict
paradigms and the spiral of escalation theory (Cottle, 2006; Hamelink, 2015).

Based on our research, we found that, first, the Zambian media landscape is highly polarised
and provides the ‘other’ as an object of projection whereby fears, frustrations, and other
negativity can be associated with any actions of the ‘other’ group. ‘China/Chinese’, ‘the
opposition’, and ‘ruling Patriotic Front’ frequently appear as the ‘other’ in the media
discourse, which abstracts the stakeholders involved. Second, polarisation amplifies and
consolidates existing perceptions of the ‘other’, which facilitates identity-based conflicts.
When othering leads to scapegoating, the root causes of grievances receive less coverage.
Lastly, the Chinese media is less integrated into the Zambian media landscape than, for
example, Western media, which leads to further perception gaps on China’s influence in
Zambia. In fact, the Chinese media often functions as its own landscape because sources are
written in Mandarin and exclusively target Chinese audiences. While the media continues to
intensify these gaps, the distrust of the Zambian government and its affiliation with China,
as well as Chinese migrants’ incentive to segregate themselves from local society for selfprotection, may grow. As a result, a vicious circle is created, which facilitates the spiral of
escalation.
2. Background

2.1 Media and Conflict
Conflict, its dangers, cleavages, and opportunities for resolution are ever changing. One
dynamic that has become increasingly important is the relationship between conflict and the
media. The media is an extremely fast-growing medium of communication that holds fact,
fiction, innermost fears, and other projections on one device. To study this relationship
between the media and conflict, it is important to analyse contexts where conflict exists and
media plays a role in how information is shared.

Conflict resolution academics and practitioners have long debated the relationship between
the media and conflict. In his book, Mediatized Conflict, Simon Cottle (2006) identifies three
paradigms that could guide research on the media’s divisive and unifying roles. The
paradigms are dated and do not fully reflect social media advances, but they still offer a
strong framework for media conflict analysis.
The first, the manufacturing consent theory, holds that the media mass produces culture in
capitalist societies. The elite has the most control over the dissemination and production of
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the media narrative. This normally manifests itself in how different groups or opinions are
censored, uplifted, or even unintentionally left out, as well as how the victims and
perpetrators are depicted.

The second, the media contest paradigm, is based on the idea of the media as a battleground.
Different groups compete for media space across two dimensions, structural and cultural.
Reports are shaped by the players’ positionality, resources, as well as the relationship with
the press. This, in one form, may be demonstrated in how certain identity groups compete
for space on a certain media outlet. For example, viewership determines a lot of the content.
As a result, the ideas shared in those videos, papers, journals, etc., will be the ones codified.

The third paradigm, the media culture paradigm, examines how media consumption shapes
identity. The expressions of class, gender, race, sexuality, as well as moral attributions, are
in part socialised through media consumption. Consumers are drawn to various corners of
media (be it television, social media, etc.) where they feel community. This process facilitates
‘us’ versus ‘them’ world views, affecting how people position themselves to others. One way
this can manifest is in the understanding of language that one group uses to define itself and
its experiences versus the language another group uses to define the former group and that
group's experiences. Differences in terminology can lead to constructive discourse or
interactions shrouded in vilification.

Cottle’s paradigms are most useful if put in dialogue with each other and other theories such
as Cees Jan Hamelink’s (2015) ‘spiral of escalation.’ In his book, Media and Conflict: Escalating
Evil, Hamelink argues that the mass media triggers mechanisms in the ‘spiral of escalation’
by offering a daily discourse of social anxiety, elevating the rhetoric of provocative leaders,
facilitating alienation by adopting divisive frames, and making possible the self-defense
argument. The spiral works both ways, and thus media can both serve to resolve and amplify
conflict. If the theory is applied to modern technological advancements, in which social
media provides for a cheaper, faster, back-and-forth type of communication that has a global
reach, it could be argued that the spiral takes on those qualities and is activated quicker and
with greater intensity.
2.2 Zambia, China, and Media Relations

In Africa, perceptions towards China are complicated and heavily dependent on the
proximity to the ‘benefits’ of individual engagement with Chinese state and non-state actors.
In Zambia, the ruling party traditionally welcomed macro-level Chinese investment and the
added value in multiple sectors (Matambo, 2019). However, local reports of unequal benefit
sharing, corruption, and poor working conditions in Chinese organisations have led to
tensions at the individual-organisational level. Frequent reference is made to the Chambishi
Copper Mine (2008) and Collum Coal Mine riots (2010) which were a result of labour
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disputes between Chinese management and Zambian miners. Western-led criticism of
Chinese territorial ambitions and human rights abuses confirms biases, for example, the
association between the Chinese and profit-driven pragmatism.
Zambia is one of the epicenters of sensationalised and ‘fake news’ about China, according to
Eric Olander, co-founder of the China Africa Project. Misinformation is shared and forwarded
through messaging platforms, and its content is frequently incendiary and xenophobic. One
is only to look at the viral Facebook post picked up by a local tabloid that alleged China was
selling canned human meat to Zambia (Olander, 2016). The story was declared a hoax after
Zambian and Chinese leaders issued public statements to fact check the misinformation.

Zambian disinformation is closely intertwined with stories coming out of other countries.
The knowledge, opinions, and conversations flowing through Anglophone countries—
Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa—mix together and, along with the fake news from one country,
feed into other countries (E. Olander, personal communication, October 14, 2020). Then, this
news and the discourse with it get a second life on Facebook and Twitter. International
media and expat media bring their own biases. Increasing the amount of sensationalised
news, now termed ‘fake news’ by many ( Mfula, personal communication, November 11,
2020). This demonstrates how pervasive, inconsistent coverage of issues and miscontextualisation by the media coupled with the emotionally driven transport of social
media can further exacerbate conflict, effectively losing the heart of where people’s
frustrations come from in the leaguering outrage. The Chinese media is often intentionally
slow to respond and prefers false allegations to dissipate on their own or for government
authorities to act first.
The reasons for these stories’ prevalence are complicated. They reflect grievances and fears
of displacement but also seem to be exploited for political aims. First, Zambian politicians
are using charged rhetoric against China, and as the 2021 Presidential election approaches,
several seem ready to evoke Michael Sata’s campaign tactics before his win in 2011. A
portion of the Zambian public associates China with the health and economic crisis triggered
by COVID-19, which compounds the ongoing accusations levied against the current
administration’s corruption and handling of Chinese debt. Second, as Zambians use Western
platforms, they are privier to Western views than to Chinese views. Third, as internet
penetration increases across Africa, these dynamics will be further tested as more people
engage in creating and sharing news. 2

The PRC government is aware that to control its image, it needs to increase its share in
Africa’s information space. In a 2010 trip to Africa, Chinese journalists vocalised the need to
balance Western coverage and present different narratives on Chinese engagement in Africa
(Li and Ronning, 2013). In recent years, there has been an increase in English and French
language Chinese-state owned multimedia broadcasting initiatives across Africa (Hollihan
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and Zhang, 2016). At present, African audiences are less likely to rely on Chinese media than
Western and indigenous media. Focus group data from Kenya and South Africa suggests that
Africans do not actively engage with the Chinese media, including CCTV/CGTN and WeChat,
and some are strongly biased against it and cited negative stereotypes of China as reasons to
avoid these platforms. (Wasserman and Morales, 2018). These sentiments alone show how
important audience perceptions are; if there is negative sentiment or no trust, then people
will not engage enough with imported media platforms to shape or reshape local views.

To avoid the monolith trap, it is important to deconstruct ‘China’ and identify the many
stakeholders involved on the continent. In a study of Chinese community associations in
Zambia, the authors distinguished between state actors – “state-owned enterprises,
diplomatic corps, and technical aid missions” and non-state actors – “long-term migrants,
traveling business people, and students” (Li and Shi, 2019). Other scholars argue the Chinese
in Africa are not a homogeneous group (Hodzi, 2019; Yan et al., 2019). While some Chinese
migrants are reluctant or unable to interact with locals due to language barriers, others,
especially highly-educated expatriates, have shown their proficiency in local languages and
willingness to integrate into local communities. Based on a survey conducted by Yan et al.
(2019, p. 53), the Chinese are the second most adaptive group, only after ‘whites’, among
those represented in Zambia.

There is a growing awareness that misinformation and damaging narratives around Chinese
engagement in Africa could be a result of prejudiced media coverage. Chinese communities
in Africa have argued that negative press harms their interests and even jeopardises their
safety. Countering misinformation on a case-by-case basis is an increasing priority for local
associations. For example, Chinese embassy officials, association leaders, and journalists
based in Zambia formed a WeChat group, ‘Fighting Media Crisis’, to exchange ideas on
fighting negative press, as they recognised how negative press exacerbates tensions leading
to the sensationalisation of events (Li and Shi, 2019, p. 162).
3. Methodology and Sources
3.1 Methodology
To study the relationship between ‘media and conflict’ with Chinese-Zambian engagement
as a case study, we used qualitatively-driven mixed methods. We conducted a frame analysis
of English and Mandarin news articles on two cases of conflict in Chinese-Zambian relations:
the 2018 ZAFFICO Scandal and Riots and the 2020 Lusaka discrimination controversy. We
selected articles from diverse Western, Zambian, and Chinese media outlets to compare their
reporting on the cases. We supplemented the findings of the paper with key informant
interviews using snowball sampling (Annex).
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We found these cases frequently cited, both in interviews with informants and the recent
literature. They feature diverse stakeholders and perspectives towards China, and they offer
a departure from the 2005 BGRIMM and 2013 Collum Coal Mine incidents, which are the
most widely studied examples of conflict in Chinese-Zambian engagement. As these cases
are current, they also reflect the evolution in China’s response to criticism and strategy – at
the state, private and migrant worker level. There is a growing awareness that the media is
an important space for interaction and reputation management and that ‘anti-China’ stories
could incite real-life violence. We were also interested in analysing cases at the intersection
of globalisation and identity politics, and these cases show frictions between different in and
out-groups and how they form representations of ‘the other.’ To identify articles, we
searched Google for key terms, including variations on China, Zambia, conflict, tension; terms
related to the selected case studies; and the titles of major Chinese, Western and Zambian
news outlets. We selected English and Mandarin articles that best complemented each other
based on the context and timing of publication.

We analysed the framing, or “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation” in each
article (University of Vermont, 2009). We also looked for the master-narratives based on
identity, which could lead to us versus them categorisation and polarisation. The three media
and conflict paradigms discussed in the previous section (manufacturing consent, media
contest, and media culture) were useful in identifying framing techniques and the
positionality of the media outlets and readership.
3.2 Sources

3.2.1 Zambian Sources
Zambian access to the media is affected by many factors from poverty, illiteracy, and uneven
electrification. However, those who have access to print and online media can choose from a
variety of sources with diverse stances and focal points. Many are influenced by their ties,
from state to external, for example, to the Zambian diaspora in the West, and almost all have
explicit political affiliations. For instance, state-owned Zambia Daily Mail and Times of
Zambia tend to bolster the position of the ruling party, the Patriotic Front. The Lusaka Times
provides a more moderate perspective, but its content is sourced largely from governmentowned news sources. Independent media that are based on online platforms, such as
Zambian Watchdog and News Diggers, are considered to be more critical of President Edgar
Lungu and in line with the opposition party, United Party for National Development (UPND)
(Mfula, 2020).
3.2.2 Chinese Sources

Most Chinese nationals in Zambia prioritise online Chinese-language news and use a range
of sources from official media to other independent platforms that cover African affairs.
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Xinhua and Global Times (Huanqiu) are top state-owned international media outlets that
report major events worldwide, but often without direct connection to what is happening on
the ground. Their journalists extensively quote Chinese embassy announcements or
Zambian media that is perceived as more objective, such as the Lusaka Times. Online
platforms that are popular among the Chinese are the Guancha Syndicate (guancha.cn) and
Toutiao (www.toutiao.com). There is only one Chinese-language newspaper published in
Zambia: The Oriental Post (Feizhouhuaqiaozhoubao), which covers various countries in
Southern Africa. 3 This newspaper cooperates with the overseas version of People’s Daily
(Remin Ribao, a Chinese official newspaper) and largely reports on issues affecting business,
such as Chinese investment, external relationships, and the latest Africa Policy.
4. Case Studies and Analysis
4.1 Case Studies
4.1.1 The ZAFFICO Controversy
On 5 November 2018, the alleged sale of the Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries
Corporation (ZAFFICO) to Chinese investors triggered several riots in Kitwe and its
neighbouring towns. It was reported that several Chinese shops were damaged and looted,
and more than 100 protesters were arrested (Zambia: Over 100 Picked Up by Police in AntiChina Protests in Kitwe, 2018). The Lungu administration blamed UPND leader Hakainde
Hichilema for inciting the riots, citing his interview with the Sun FM radio programme.
Hichilema had accused the Zambian government of listing ZAFFICO on the stock market as
part of a scheme to sell shares to the Chinese. The issue remains controversial to this date,
with the media becoming a battlefield for competing narratives.

News outlets like Zambia Daily Mail and the Lusaka Times took a hard line against
Hichilema’s announcement and relied on Patriotic Front party officials’ statements to
challenge it (ZAFFICO Has Not Been Sold; It's Fake News Created by Overzealous OppositionDora Siliya, 2018; Musonda et al., 2018). Comments on a Zambia Report article accused
Hichilema of spreading rumours and acting as an irresponsible politician (Phiri, 2018). At
the end of November, the Lusaka Times published an article highlighting the Chinese Foreign
Ministry’s praise for President Edgar Lungu’s handling of the “false China-related reports”
(China Happy with President Lungu's Defense of Its Interests in Zambia, 2018).
Zambian Watchdog reported the story from a different angle, expressing support for
Hichilema and questioning why the government would list a natural resource company - as
it is not profitable and should not be privatised - on the stock market (Zambian Watchdog,
2018a, 2018b). Commenters on Zambian Watchdog’s Facebook page showed their support
for Hichilema and posted sarcastic comments about the PF government’s tendency to blame
everything on the opposition party. Hichilema defended himself on BBC Radio and offered a
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timeline of government actions that shaped his thinking on the issue (VoiceUp News Zambia,
2018). After official government sources labelled the ZAFFICO sale as fake news, proopposition continued to question the legitimacy of the assertion (It’s the Land Not Zaffico
per se That Has Been Sold, 2018).

As for Chinese media outlets, the Oriental Post and Guancha Syndicate both accused
Hichilema of causing the conflict. An Oriental Post headline even called Hichilema’s denial of
the accusation “pale and powerless” (Kitwe Riot Is Directed to Opposition Party’s Incitation,
HH’s Denial Seems Pale and Powerless, 2018; Tang, 2018). Xinhua reported a small
demonstration led by Zambian miners and businessmen one week after the riot. They
denounced Hichilema’s statement and accused him of breeding xenophobia. They feared
Chinese investors would decide to leave Zambia (Mym, 2018). This event, however, did not
attract as much attention as the earlier protests in Zambian media outlets.

ZAFFICO made headlines again in 2019 after the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA),
an international NGO with headquarters in London and Washington DC, published a report
about ZAFFICO’s role in corrupt practices (Environmental Investigative Agency, 2019).
According to the report, ZAFFICO was a cover for well-connected Zambian and Chinese
business operators to illegally traffic an endangered species of rosewood. Yet again,
oppositionist-linked and pro-government media interpreted the events from different
angles (Diggers Editor, 2019; Mwamba, 2019a, 2019b; Ruwe, 2019). While Zambian News
Diggers and Zambian Watchdog cited the report as proof of PF government corruption,
sources such as Zambia Daily Mail denounced the report as propaganda and even hinted it
was strategically released in advance of the 2021 elections to “sully, soil, and damage the
local and international image of President Lungu” (Mwamba, 2019b). While Chinese outlets,
such as the Guancha Syndicate, mostly quoted official Chinese embassy statements and
refrained from taking sides, comments on the article revealed competing views. The
comments with most likes blamed Western NGOs for escalating tensions and obstructing
other countries’ development. However, there were also comments positing that China’s role
in deforestation merited the negative backlash.
4.1.2. Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Response to COVID-19

Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, several Chinese businesses in Lusaka were
accused of displaying anti-Blackness, such as turning away Zambian customers and
preventing workers from going home after work. Zambian Watchdog used loaded rhetoric
while reporting the cases - “Zambians wake up! Your country is being taken away. The
Chinese have regrouped and you are still sleeping” (Muchima, 2020). The Mayor of Lusaka,
Miles Sampa, soon launched an investigation into the incident in May 2020 and shut down
Chinese businesses that allegedly discriminated against Zambians (Sampa, 2020; Racist
Chinese Barbershop Closed, 2020). Surprisingly, just one week later, Sampa apologised for
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revoking trading licences and using discriminative language against the Chinese (Nkomesha,
2020). One day before his apology, Local Government Minister Charles Banda warned Sampa
that unilaterally revoking trading licences is against standard procedure (Local Government
Minister Opposes Lusaka Mayor for Closing Down Abusive Chinese-Owned Businesses,
2020). Segments of the public believed that the apology had been coerced. Lily Mutamz, a
UK-based Zambian livestream commentator on YouTube, suggested the Mayor was
pressured into apologising to delegitimise him. In the comments, many of her followers
agreed with her and found it hypocritical that the Chinese did not have to apologise for
mistreating Zambians (Lily Mutamz TV, 2020). An op-ed on Diggers News also argued that
the government was allowing the Chinese to break laws freely (Sakala, 2020). Zambian
Watchdog responded to Banda’s statement by saying, “With this intervention, the Chinese
are now free to discriminate [against] Black people in their businesses.” This post attracted
over two-thousand comments from those who supported Sampa’s actions (Zambian
Watchdog, 2020a).
Mayor Sampa’s political affiliation should not be ignored—he is the nephew of former
President Michael Sata. It is speculated that Sampa is copying his uncle’s strategy—stirring
up Sinophobia as part of a campaign strategy—and cultivating an image that would help him
eventually run for President (Matambo, 2019; Marsh and Sinyangwe, 2020). Although the
correlation is unclear, several criminal activities against Chinese nationals were reported
after Sampa’s charged rhetoric, which suggests an increase in Sinophobia. On May 24, 2020,
three Chinese nationals were brutally murdered over a pay dispute at a warehouse in
Makeni, a suburb of Lusaka (Three Chinese Murdered Over Pay Dispute, 2020). Crimes
against the Chinese continued to happen. On September 16, 2020, armed thieves robbed a
Chinese mining company’s dormitory, in which three Chinese nationals and two Zambians
were assaulted (Armed Thieves Rob Chinese Firm in Luano, 2020).

The Zambian media showed much more uniformity and discouraged sensational reports on
these tragedies. Even Zambian Watchdog, which often takes an anti-Chinese stance, limited
itself to an official Zambia Police statement; most comments under the post also condemned
the attacks (Zambian Watchdog, 2020b). Some media outlets even expressed alarm over the
potential racial motivation behind the murders and sent a clear message to readers, “You
can’t kill a Chinese national by taking advantage of the current anti-Chinese sentiment”
(Mwewa Lane, 2020). Chinese media outlets argued that the perceived discrimination was a
misunderstanding, but that social media and Mayor Sampa’s ‘radical’ policies intensified the
situation. For instance, a report on Caixin (a popular financial newspaper in China) clarified
that the restaurant worker accused of racism was innocent and his actions misinterpreted.
The restaurant’s security camera showed that the dispute was over anti-epidemic measures,
and no other Zambians in the restaurant were mistreated (Qing, 2020); the government’s
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investigation group supported these findings. Zambia Reports corroborated this point of
view (Phiri, 2020).

Global Times reported that the increase in robberies and murder was due to the influence of
anti-Chinese rhetoric used by local media and politicians. Those unfamiliar with the truth
started to channel anti-Chinese sentiments (Zhao et al., 2020). According to a report on
Toutiao (Look at The World, 2020), the misunderstanding stemmed from Chinese stores’
implementation of strict anti-epidemic measures after cases of the virus were reported in
Zambia in March 2020, including closed-off management and control of visitors, similar to
precautions taken in China. These measures were seldom properly introduced by the
Zambian media. An anonymous source in this report said the Chinese were worried about
the rising anti-Chinese sentiment as robberies continued to happen after the murder. Some
even hired guards or bought guns to defend themselves. “Many colleagues are being called
‘virus’ on the street,” the source added. This report went viral on the internet and received
more than five thousand comments. Chinese netizens flocked to the post to express their
anger or question if the accusations of racism were exaggerated for political optics. 4
4.2 Analysis

Based on a review of media sources from 2018 to 2020, we found significant differences in
how Zambian and Chinese media outlets framed and reported events. Strong cleavages exist
in the Zambian media environment, shaped by English and Mandarin language outlets’
partisan affiliation. Zambia’s state-owned media, Zambia Daily Mail and Times of Zambia
tend to highlight the benefits and historical significance of Chinese-Zambian economic
relations. As for independent media like Zambian Watchdog and News Diggers, they report
more openly on acts of anti-Chinese prejudice. Such differences consolidate viewers’ existing
values or stereotypes, which also give politicians or activists the opportunity to mobilise
anti-Chinese sentiment, disregarding what is true and what is not, to bolster their political
platforms.
Chinese state-owned media, such as The Oriental Post and Xinhua, strive to report positive
developments to boost China’s image and quote extensively from governmental statements.
However, they publish harsh criticism of anti-Chinese behaviour, mostly casting blame on
Zambian opposition parties or politicians, when China’s reputation or Zambia-China
relations are attacked. Chinese online platforms, such as Guancha Syndicate and Toutiao,
demonstrate similar patterns but publish more first-hand information and opinions and thus
attract more critical or sensationalised comments from the readers.

It is important to note that loaded language was used across outlets, but different outlets flipflopped villains and heroes based on their positionality. The tension is largely internal, with
the PF government, on one side, and opposition parties (UPND, RRP, etc.) on the other, with
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different stances reflecting different sides of the partisan divide. Chinese sources tend to
support the PF government narrative because it strengthens China’s positive image and
maximises the stability of the relations between the two countries.

The polarised nature of the Zambian media landscape influences perspectives on Chinese
activity in Zambia, reinforces in-group out-group identities, and distorts responses to
information. In tense situations, variation in contextualising information leads to perceived
clashes between group interests. Furthermore, a media environment in which false,
incomplete, or inaccurate information is pervasive, attempts to discredit stories are
interpreted as a devaluation of opposing perspectives, and there arises even more
imperative to defend in-group interests.

Especially in the 2018 case, the ‘media contest’ paradigm described by Cottle best reflects
competition in a polarised Zambian media environment. Their reporting on opposition
leader Hichilema diverged. While one side blamed Hichilema for spreading rumours and
inciting the riots, it focused less on people’s distrust of the government and concerns about
job loss. The other side represented Zambian people’s grievances and questioned the
government’s affiliation with China, but provided little evidence to support its claims and
relied on blackbox language. The competitive nature of the media only consolidates the
Zambian people’s existing stance for/against China. The EIA report in 2019 shows that, even
though ZAFFICO was not sold to the Chinese, people’s suspicions were likely rooted in a
history of government corruption. Yet again, the media diverged on their views. The ‘truth’
remains unclear, but different media positionalities often only consolidate existing
perceptions.
It is important to note that the target of mediated violence is frequently the Chinese migrant
community in Zambia, unconnected to larger business dealings between the Zambian
government and Chinese investors. This scapegoating could be a result of the media’s
creation and elevation of leaders’ loaded rhetoric against a monolithic ‘Chinese/China’ threat
which projects fears, frustrations, and other negativity onto anyone of visible Asian descent.

As for the year 2020, we found that the manufacturing consent theory and media culture
paradigm are useful for analysing the case. As anti-Chinese sentiment was rising due to the
spread of COVID-19, Sampa took advantage of the shift in public attitudes and ‘manufactured’
the image of a prejudiced Chinese migrant population. This image is possible because of the
stereotypes about the Chinese formed over the years. Especially during a time of rampant
misinformation about COVID-19’s origins, the additional association between ‘the Chinese’
and the virus is easily exploited. However, as the events unfolded, it became clear that
cultural differences, language barriers, and perceptions of the ‘other’ most likely contributed
to misunderstanding.
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Once mainstream views take shape, it is difficult to change the narrative. For example,
Zambian Report unpacked the discriminative restaurant incident, but commenters did not
believe the report though clear evidence was provided (Phiri, 2020). As for the media culture
paradigm, when some Zambian media outlets showed support for Sampa’s actions, the view
of ‘us’ (Zambian) versus ‘them’ (Chinese) became more pronounced. Such a view gained
support rapidly because the Chinese were not just accused of racism, but also of their
intention to exclude local people or ‘segregate’ themselves from local communities. Thus,
according to some, the Chinese were not just discriminating against Zambians but also taking
away job opportunities and monopolising the benefits of economic development.

Disregarding if the Chinese intend to segregate or not, if anti-Chinese sentiment and crimes
against Chinese people continue to grow, this might force the Chinese to further segregate
themselves from locals. As Yan et al. (2019) argued, the main causes of Chinese selfsegregation are due to structural factors, including anti-Chinese discrimination, as opposed
to ‘subjective consciousness.’ In fact, most Chinese migrants are willing to embrace and adapt
to the host society. However, when the media creates an environment of ‘us’ versus ‘them’,
the Chinese will have to protect themselves by adopting segregation from the locals, but that
will only increase anti-Chinese sentiment. A spiral of escalation is, therefore, created.
There is a second layer to the mechanism. The Chinese media mostly engages Chinese
audiences. Segments of the media are delivering the message that Zambians mistreat
Chinese migrants and that opposition political leaders are purposely and untruthfully
demonising the Chinese. Thus, all critiques and attacks against the Chinese government or
Chinese people could be perceived as political manipulation while structural factors that
make the Chinese presence unwelcome are neglected. Such a point of view may discourage
Chinese immigrants from integrating with the local society or embracing the opinions of the
opposition. In short, the different style and focus of Chinese media may also worsen the
image of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ As a result, Chinese engagement with Zambians would only
decline, as well as the chance for Zambian people to get to know the Chinese. Moreover, as
both the Zambian and Chinese media continue to polarise views, the lack of engagement and
the problem of asymmetric information between Zambians and the Chinese will deteriorate
as well.
5. Conclusion

The media plays a role in polarising views and amplifying societal tensions around ChineseZambian engagement. We found visible differences in tone, word choice, and selection of
detail between articles depending on the positionality of the outlet and its readership. These
differences in frames could be a contributing factor to polarisation and conflict escalation in
inter-group conflict. The majority of Chinese stakeholders are not malign actors, as some
media sources suggest, but differences between them and the Zambian people are
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capitalised on in a divisive political environment. The media certainly reflects real
grievances, but also sensationalises and exaggerates information for political ends.

Analysing the media presents an interesting but also daunting task as there are so many
points of distortion. People are inundated with information, and it is difficult to discover the
root of the problem and not get emotionally invested in the discourse taking place. Similarly,
for researchers, it is difficult to limit where, when, and what to assess in the media. From
this, the question of positionality arises as how someone adds to the conversation is affected
by the identity they hold in relation to the identity of the group, society, or country being
researched. The other difficulty with media analysis is reflecting intersectionality in the
analysis. There are socioeconomic differences that affect who can participate in the media
discourse and whose identities are validated. All of these ideas feed into information
reliability, and there is no guarantee that the media is an accurate reflection of what is
happening in society.

Without effective spaces for addressing legitimate grievances and mediating between
different views, the media will continue to escalate tensions and be used as a tool to incite
violence. Those who study the media in any context should acknowledge positionality and
intersectionality, and those working with activists, journalists, or stakeholders could create
workshops and facilitate discussion on navigating media in different contexts.
1

Governmental ties between China and Zambia date back to the 1960s when China committed itself to the
TAZARA railway project in 1967. The railroad has been an important symbol of Chinese-Zambian friendship to this
day. However, it is not the only reason to keep their relationship. By 2015, China became the largest investor in
Zambia, with 9% of China’s total FDI going to the country (UNCTAD, 2019). China now accounts for around 80%
of infrastructure in Zambia. The number of Chinese nationals residing in Zambia is reportedly growing rapidly as
well, which was around 20 thousand in 2014 and reached 30 thousand in 2020, and the Chinese are even referred to
as the ‘74th nation of Zambia’ by the Zambian government (Che, 2020; Postel, 2017).
2
As of 2020, the number of Internet users increased to 4.45 million (+16%), while 16 million people gained mobile
connection (+5.6%) in Zambia, and as a result, social media users increased to 2.3 million (+19%). To put these
numbers in perspective, Zambia’s population is 18.12 million and, it is important to note that the median age is 17.6.
While community radio continues to serve as the greatest source of information across many rural areas of SubSaharan Africa and internet penetration is low, there is already indication of how the continent will transform. The
youth bulge and continued digitisation will likely lead to growth in citizen journalism and political organisation
around collective identity and shared goals inspired by outside influences. However, state pushback and use of these
tools by malign actors will check their activity.
3
The Oriental Post also has other online versions, such as Qiaowang (http://www.qiaowang.org/) and WeChat
public account (huaqiaozhoubao).
4
There were many angry comments in the post, such as “do not trust Africans” or the “Chinese must retaliate,”
while some argued that Zambians just envy the rich Chinese and that there are always risks to doing business in
Africa. Also, one of the comments clarified that “I know the restaurant (Lan Tian), it is famous in the local, and
many of its chefs and clerks are black people. How can this restaurant be discriminative?”
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